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Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act modifies the
Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor,
or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity of an asset-backed financial product from betting
against that very product for one year after the product’s initial sale. The rule prohibits anyone
who structures or sells an asset-backed security or a product composed of asset-backed securities
from going short, in the specified timeframe, on what they have sold, and labels such transactions
as presenting material conflicts of interest. This Comment discusses traces this new law’s devel-
opment through the Financial Crisis by recounting the events involving alleged material conflicts
of interest that gave rise to Section 621’s drafting as well as statements of its drafters. The Com-
ment then argues that adding a disclosure exemption to Section 621 via the corresponding SEC
regulation implementing it would be preferable to an outright prohibition because a disclosure ex-
emption would 1) be more consistent with the securities laws; 2) provide purchasers with sufficient
protection while still allowing the markets to operate with limited restriction; and 3) allow buyers
to price the risk of securities affected by material conflicts of interest.
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By Joshua R. Rosenthal* 
ABSTRACT 
Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act modifies the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the 
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any 
affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity of an asset-backed financial 
product from betting against that very product for one year after the 
product’s initial sale. The rule prohibits anyone who structures or 
sells an asset-backed security or a product composed of asset-backed 
securities from going short, in the specified timeframe, on what they 
have sold, and labels such transactions as presenting material 
conflicts of interest. This Comment discusses traces this new law’s 
development through the Financial Crisis by recounting the events 
involving alleged material conflicts of interest that gave rise to 
Section 621’s drafting as well as statements of its drafters. The 
Comment then argues that adding a disclosure exemption to Section 
621 via the corresponding SEC regulation implementing it would be 
preferable to an outright prohibition because a disclosure exemption 
would 1) be more consistent with the securities laws; 2) provide 
purchasers with sufficient protection while still allowing the markets 
to operate with limited restriction; and 3) allow buyers to price the 
risk of securities affected by material conflicts of interest. 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 621 (“Section 621”) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Dodd-Frank Act”) 
modifies the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the underwriter, 
placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or 
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subsidiary of any such entity of an asset-backed financial product from 
betting against that very product for one year after the product’s initial 
sale.1 The rule prohibits anyone who structures or sells an asset-backed 
security (“ABS”) or a product composed of asset-backed securities from 
going short, in the specified timeframe, on what they have sold.2 This 
runs counter to the established principles of the the federal securities 
laws, which focus primarily on disclosure and include few per se bans 
on transactions.3 
In the midst of the Financial Crisis, the SEC and Congress launched 
investigations focused on alleged misdeeds by one of Wall Street’s 
biggest players, Goldman, Sachs & Co (“Goldman”).4 At the core of the 
government’s interest in Goldman lay several structured financial 
products. Among those products was “ABACUS 2007-AC1,” a highly 
controversial offering because it referenced a portfolio of subprime 
residential mortgage backed securities chosen by a party that went short, 
or bet against, that same referenced portfolio.5 At the same time, 
                                                                                                                 
 
*J.D. 2012, Fordham Law School; A.B. 2007, Brown University. I am truly grateful to 
my wife, Kate, for all her support and advice. Likewise, I am most appreciative of my 
parents. Throughout this entire process, Professor Richard Scott Carnell has been 
nothing short of an amazing and inspiring mentor. I am indebted to him for all his help. 
Likewise, I must thank Professors Russell Pearce, Douglass Seidman, Marcella 
Silverman, and Elizabeth Maresca for all their guidance over the past two years. Their 
dedication has greatly improved my legal writing, and I cannot thank them enough. 
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-
203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631-32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a). In 
the wake of the Financial Crisis, Congress drafted Dodd-Frank for the following 
purposes: “[1] to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, [2] to end ‘too big to fail’, [3] 
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [4] to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id. at preamble. 
 2. Id. at 1632. 
 3. See infra Part V. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. Complaint, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
16, 2010) [hereinafter Abacus Complaint]; STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS 
OF THE S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., 
WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 318-
639 (Comm. Print 2011), [hereinafter ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE], available 
at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf. 
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Goldman structured and sold a series of similar products that the 
institution itself shorted.6 Alarmed, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan and 
Senator Jeffrey Merkley of Oregon labeled such deals as “Designed to 
Fail,” and drafted Section 621 in response.7 
From their understanding of Goldman’s alleged misdeeds, Section 
621’s authors argue that assembling asset-backed securities and selling 
them should require heightened duties to one’s clients because such 
assemblers have extraordinary “control over whether a security is 
intended to succeed or fail.”8 Despite this potential for control, the 
securities laws already provide sufficient remedies for those damaged by 
such assemblers and thus, provide incentives against such misdeeds.9 
By enacting Section 621, Congress, in essence, responded “No” to 
the following question: Would you allow someone to live in a house 
where the house’s electrician had an insurance policy that rewarded him 
in the event the building were to burn down?10 
Now, consider the following question: Is it illegal or unacceptable 
for a casino11 to set odds on the outcome of a sports game, take bets 
from gamblers and then profit from the spread of odds and the losses 
incurred by the gamblers? No, because it is expected that casinos will 
set odds in their favor (and no one forces the gambler to wager his 
money) and the gambler is privy to the same information that the casino 
has. In the end, the casino will only profit if the gambler fails, yet this is 
                                                                                                                 
 
*I take no position on the veracity of all allegations discussed in this Comment. For the 
purposes of this Comment, I treat all such accusations as true solely for the purpose of 
illustrating the types of activity that Section 621 is designed to prevent. 
 6. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 9. 
 7. Jeffrey Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 
48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 523 (2011) [hereinafter Policy Essay]. 
 8. Id. at 549-50. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. 156 CONG. REC. S4057 (May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley); 
156 CONG. REC. S5894 (July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (making a 
similar comparison using a mechanic who fixes a car’s brakes while simultaneously 
taking out a life insurance policy against the life of the car’s driver). 
 11. For an interesting analysis comparing and applying securities regulation of 
structured financial products to gambling laws, see Christopher B. Chuff, Comment, 
“Rolling the Dice” on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law as a Framework 
for Regulating Structured Investments, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 569 (2011). 
In the United States, investments are more leniently regulated than gambling. Id. at 613. 
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perfectly acceptable because the gambler is aware of the risk assumed 
and because the gambler understands that the casino is on the other side 
of the wager. 
The securities laws, the essence of which is fundamentally 
disclosure, function much like the casino question because the securities 
laws place a premium on both sides having equal information and do not 
focus on categorically restricting transactions.12 This comment examines 
existing principles of disclosure and fraud in the securities laws to show 
why Section 621 is overly restrictive and runs counter to general 
conceptions of securities regulation. With proper disclosure and existing 
remedies for fraud and misstatements, there is little reason to restrict a 
buyer from purchasing a product even when the product’s structurer or 
seller stands to profit from its demise.13 
In Part I, the text and meaning of Section 621 are examined. Part II 
examines four transactions arranged by Goldman and their effect on the 
drafters of Section 621. Through statements made by Senators Merkley 
and Levin and a review of the government’s investigations and 
allegations against Goldman, the transactions’ profound influence on 
Section 621 are highlighted. Part III examines the legislative history of 
Section 621, part of the Merkley-Levin Provisions, and further 
reinforces how much Goldman’s alleged misdeeds influenced the 
substance of Section 621. Part IV reviews the existing securities laws in 
light of their emphasis on disclosure. In Part IV, this Comment argues 
that the categorical ban found in Section 621 is not consistent with the 
fundamentals of disclosure because the securities laws are premised not 
on the underlying quality or characteristics of securities, but rather are 
focused on ensuring that investors receive adequate information about 
those securities. Finally, Part V outlines this Comment’s ultimate 
recommendation: the creation of a disclosure exemption to Section 621 
which would be included in the SEC rule implementing Section 621. 
This Park argues that an outright right ban on the sale or distribution of 
securities affected by material conflicts of interest is not preferable to a 
simple disclosure requirement because: 1) the markets exist in part for 
parties to take opposite positions and material conflicts of interest do not 
alter this fact; 2) adequate disclosure will facilitate investment, despite 
the existence of material conflicts of interest; and 3) buyers will price 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See infra Part V.A. 
 13. See infra Part VI.A 
2012]   BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE 1267 
OR SIMPLY ROLLING THE DICE 
 
risk associated with material conflicts of interest into agreements. From 
there, this Part discusses ways a disclosure requirement or exemption 
could be created, ultimately recommending that SEC Rule 127B, the 
rule that will regulate Section 621 now being explored and drafted by 
the SEC, contain a disclosure exemption.14 This recommendation is 
based on the SEC’s authority to create exemptions and because this 
avenue offers a more streamlined and efficient way of adding the 
exemption when compared to the alternatives. 
I. TEXT AND MEANING OF SECTION 621 
Section 621 adds Section 27B to the Securities Act of 1933.15 It 
provides: 
An underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or 
any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of an asset-backed 
security (as such term is defined in section 78c of this title, which for 
the purposes of this section shall include a synthetic asset-backed 
security), shall not, at any time for a period ending on the date that is 
one year after the date of the first closing of the sale of the asset-
backed security, engage in any transaction that would involve or 
result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor 
in a transaction arising out of such activity.16 
It goes on to create three exemptions from this general prohibition: 
1) risk mitigating or hedging activities arising out of the underlying 
security; 2) liquidity commitments involving the underlying security; 
and 3) bona fide market making for the security’s sale.17 
Section 621’s authors explain that their intention in drafting the 
prohibition with the term “material conflict of interest” is essentially to 
block the structurer or seller of an asset-backed security (or synthetic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See SEC Proposed Rule on Conflicts of Interest, SEC (Sept. 19, 2011) 
[hereinafter SEC Proposed Rule 127B], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed 
/2011/34-65355.pdf. The current draft of SEC Rule 127B solicits comments about a 
possible disclosure exemption but contains no such exemption. Id. at 89-95. 
 15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-
203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631-32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a). 
 16. Id. § 621(a). 
 17. Id. § 621(c). 
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equivalent) from taking a short position on that same security.18 They 
make it clear that such short positions are banned, explicitly noting that 
disclosure of such a short position is not adequate to mend the conflict 
of interest.19 This Comment argues that a disclosure exemption is not 
only appropriate, but preferable to any outright prohibition of 
transactions affected by material conflicts of interest. 
II. THE GOLDMAN CDOS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SECTION 621 
The four structured financial products sold by Goldman discussed 
is Subparts A and B (the “Goldman CDOs”) became the hallmarks of 
the need for Section 621 in the eyes of Congress. Indeed, these specific 
Credit Default Obligation (“CDO”) products are referenced and 
admonished throughout the legislative history of Section 621 and again 
when Section 621’s authors lauded their work’s final passage into law. 
To understand how the drafters of Section 621 viewed Goldman’s 
actions and the profound effect those actions had on the drafters, this 
Part focuses on the Goldman CDOs’ treatment in: 1) a report by the 
Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,20 chaired by 
Senator Levin; 2) various statements and writings by Senators Merkley 
and Levin; as well as 3) the SEC’s litigation against Goldman and 
Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman Sachs vice president, who helped structure 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 549 (“A firm that underwrites an asset-
backed security would run afoul of the provision . . . if it takes the short position in a 
synthetic asset-backed security that references the same assets it created because this 
results in the firm essentially betting against assets that it previously packaged.”) (citing 
156 CONG. REC. S2599 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin)); 
Regulation Developments 2010, 66 BUS. LAW. 665, 726 (2011) (“The legislative history 
of section 621 indicates that Congress intended to address blatant conflicts of interest in 
which an underwriter or sponsor creates an [asset-backed security] that is designed to 
fail and then profits by betting against it, by means of short sales or otherwise.”) 
(quotations omitted). 
 19. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 550 (“Even a disclosure to the purchaser of the 
underlying asset-backed security that the underwriter has—or might in the future—bet 
against that asset will not cure the material conflict of interest.”); Letter from Senators 
Jeffrey Merkley & Carl Levin to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, et al. (Aug. 3, 2010) 
(“[T]he utility of disclosures must be carefully examined, and not be seen as a cure for 
the conflicts.”) [hereinafter Merkley-Levin Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/co 
mments/df-title-vi/conflicts-of-interest/conflictsofinterest-2.pdf. 
 20. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5. 
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Abacus.21 This treatment shows that, in large part, Section 621 is a 
reaction to the outrage at Goldman’s practices in developing and selling 
the CDOs explored in this Comment, and details the government’s 
accusations of fraud and misstatements against Goldman. In viewing 
these transactions, it seems that Goldman’s misdeeds stem more from 
non-disclosure or misstatements concerning conflicts of interest than the 
underlying conflicts. 
A. ABACUS 2007-AC1 (“ABACUS”) 
In 2006 and early 2007, Goldman began developing and issuing 
investments in Abacus, a $2 billion synthetic CDO referencing mid and 
subprime residential mortgages that were rated BBB at the time they 
were selected for inclusion in the deal.22 Abacus was unique among the 
Goldman CDOs examined here because Goldman allowed a third party 
client, hedge fund Paulson & Co. (“Paulson”), to pick the underlying 
mortgages.23 Not only that, but the entire CDO was, according to 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse and the SEC, arranged at Paulson’s 
request.24 
Paulson, convinced that subprime mortgages were overvalued and 
that many of them were destined to fail, sought to take positions where it 
could capitalize in the event of major defaults in the subprime market.25 
As one of Goldman’s largest clients in the residential mortgage-backed 
securities (“RMBS”) arena, Paulson had tremendous sway with 
Goldman.26 At the same time, the SEC’s Complaint against Goldman 
and Tourre goes on to allege that Goldman “recognized that market 
conditions were presenting challenges to the successful marketing of 
CDO transactions backed by mortgage-related securities.”27 Paulson 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16, 
2010). 
 22. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 395. 
 23. Id. at 396. The report characterizes this activity as allowing the third party, here 
Paulson, to “rent” the CDO because its actual structure is set up by Goldman, which 
also markets the CDO to clients. Id. 
 24. Id.; Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 3. 
 25. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 396; Abacus Complaint, 
supra note 5, ¶ 15-17. 
 26. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 396. 
 27. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 18; Logically, this allegation makes much 
sense to include in the Complaint. First, it allows the SEC to show that Goldman was 
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approached Goldman in mid to late 2006 looking for an opportunity to 
short a portfolio of RMBS that Paulson itself could select.28 The SEC 
alleged that Goldman and Tourre knew that disclosing Paulson’s level of 
involvement with the selection of the underlying assets and its short 
position on layers within the overall CDO would make Abacus a tough 
sell to investors seeking to go long on the CDO.29 To remedy this issue 
and remove Paulson from the face of Abacus, Goldman or Paulson 
sought out a third party portfolio selection agent, eventually hiring ACA 
Management LLC (“ACA”).30 ACA’s involvement then would mask 
Paulson’s role in Abacus and additionally, bolster Abacus’s credibility 
with investors by making it seem as though the underlying assets in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
cognizant of the difficulties presented by going long on subprime mortgages and thus 
the difficulties in finding anyone willing to buy such positions without getting into the 
CDO activities Goldman undertook to short that subprime securities for its own 
accounts, which would be too much of a frolic and detour in a relatively pithy 
complaint. Second, it details an extra incentive for Goldman to hire ACA, discussed 
below, in an attempt to cover up Paulson’s involvement in the selection process because 
again it shows that Goldman realized how difficult it would be to sell these investments 
generally let alone with a likely-biased hedge fund selecting the underlying assets. 
Third, it allowed the SEC to introduce the world to “Fabulous” Fabrice Tourre by 
quoting and thereby publicizing tête-à-tête emails where Tourre describes the 
destruction the “exotic” CDOs caused while admitting he himself never quite 
understood them: “More and more leverage in the system, The whole building is about 
to collapse anytime now . . . . Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] . . . 
standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created 
without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities 
[sic]!!!” Id. Tourre’s now infamous emails were quoted widely, making Tourre a poster 
boy for the bankers who contributed to the Financial Crisis. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, 
Wall Street’s Mr. Fabu-Less, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at A02; Hugo Dixon & 
Richard Beales, Major Distraction Hinders Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at 
B2. 
  Citing the same email, ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE argues “Goldman 
did not view any of the four CDOs examined in this Report [including Abacus] as 
sound investments for the clients to whom it sold the securities.” Supra note 5, at 620. 
The sole source cited on this sentence’s point is one of Tourre’s emails. Id. 
 28. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 15; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, 
supra note 5, at 561. 
 29. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 19. 
 30. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 567. Understandably, 
Paulson and Goldman point fingers at each other here: Tourre claims Paulson sought to 
employ a portfolio selection agent while a Paulson Managing Director testified in a 
deposition that Goldman suggested the idea. Id. 
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CDO were selected by a well-regarded, neutral third party.31 Emails 
written by Tourre and other Goldman employees suggest that they 
believed it was essential that the portfolio selection agent be willing to 
allow Paulson to select the underlying assets for Abacus.32 Despite 
ACA’s neutral appearance, Paulson played an intimate role in selecting 
the assets underlying Abacus.33 
From January to March 2007, Paulson worked closely with 
Goldman and ACA to select the assets that Abacus would reference.34 
After analyzing BBB-rated mortgages and bonds comprised of such 
mortgages, Paulson developed a set of criteria that Goldman could 
reference in selecting the assets that would comprise Abacus.35 Using 
the criteria, Goldman selected securities and returned a database 
containing those selections to Paulson for review.36 From that database 
of candidates, Paulson selected 123 securities, which Goldman then 
passed on to ACA.37 Through alleged representations by Goldman, ACA 
believed that Paulson was going long on Abacus.38 Over the next few 
months, ACA worked with Paulson to finalize the portfolio.39 The CDO 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 22-24; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL 
COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 565 (quoting an internal Goldman memorandum stating: 
“We expect to leverage ACA’s credibility and franchise to help distribute this 
transaction.”). The Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, also references the same quote at 
paragraph 24. 
 32. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 562-63. 
 33. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 25-35; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL 
COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 396-97. 
 34. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 565-66. 
 35. Id.; Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 25. As for the criteria Paulson 
developed: “[it] included a high percentage of adjustable rate mortgages, relatively low 
borrower FICO scores, and a high concentration of mortgages in states like Arizona, 
California, Florida and Nevada that had recently experienced high rates of home price 
appreciation.” Id. 
 36. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 566. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 396, 569. This misrepresentation and various actions by Goldman 
surrounding this issue are discussed infra Part V.B.i. Tourre “categorically” denied 
these allegations when testifying to the Subcommittee on Investigations. See Wall 
Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and 
Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Investment Banks Hearing] 
(statement of Fabrice Tourre). 
 39. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 566. 
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reference portfolio was finalized on March 22, 2007 with Paulson and 
ACA agreeing to include 90 Baa2 rated mid and subprime RMBS issued 
after January 1, 2006.40 Of the 90 securities underlying Abacus, Paulson 
proposed 49 and ACA proposed 41 with both sides approving every 
security included.41 With the reference portfolio finalized, Goldman 
sought to have Abacus rated by Moody’s.42 
Without being cognizant of Paulson’s involvement in Abacus, 
Moody’s issued AAA ratings to two of Abacus’s six tranches.43 Later, 
before Senator Levin’s Subcommittee on Investigations, a former 
Moody’s director who worked on appraising Abacus testified that 
knowing about Paulson’s involvement would have been an important 
consideration in rating Abacus.44 A finalized portfolio and solid rating in 
hand, Goldman began issuing Abacus securities to investors.45 
Abacus closed and issued securities on April 26, 2007, with three 
investors taking the long side and one going short on the CDO.46 The 
three long investors purchased slightly more than $1 billion in Abacus 
securities: 1) IKB, a German commercial bank, bought $150 million 
AAA-rated Abacus securities; 2) ACA, the portfolio selection agent, 
purchased $42 million AAA-rated Abacus securities to place in another 
CDO it was managing; and 3) ACA’s parent, ACA Financial Guaranty 
Corp., went long $909 million on assets referenced by the most senior 
Abacus tranche.47 At the same time, Goldman took the short side of 
these investments, and, unknown to the three aforementioned investors, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 569. 
 42. Id. at 568. 
 43. Id.; Investment Banks Hearing, supra note 38, statement of Sen. Carl Levin. 
 44. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Ratings Agencies: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Eric 
Kolchinsky, Former Managing Director, Moody’s Investors Services) (“[Knowing 
about Paulson’s involvement in the portfolio selection process and its short position] 
just changes the whole dynamic on [Abacus], where the person who is putting it 
together, choosing it, wants it to blow up.”). 
 45. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 572. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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transferred those short interests to Paulson.48 As a result of this transfer, 
Paulson’s bet against the CDO went unknown to the long investors.49  
The value of the securities underlying Abacus fell dramatically in 
the year following Abacus’s closing.50 By October 24, 2007, 83% of 
those RMBS were downgraded by the ratings agencies.51 By January 29, 
2008, 99% of them were downgraded.52 Abacus’s three long investors 
lost more than $1 billion combined while Paulson, as the corresponding 
and only short investor, collected a profit of about $1 billion from the 
CDO.53 Abacus securities are currently worthless.54 
B. THREE CDOS THAT GOLDMAN ITSELF SHORTED 
The following three CDOs are grouped together because they are 
similar in nature and also because Goldman itself took short positions on 
their performance. 
1. Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 (“Hudson”) 
Hudson was a $2 billion synthetic CDO referencing $1.2 billion in 
ABX assets owned by Goldman and $800 million in Credit Default 
Swaps (“CDS”) based on subprime RMBS and CDO securities.55 
Additionally, all assets referenced by Hudson were rated BBB or    
BBB-.56 Anatomy of a Financial Crisis argues that Hudson was used by 
Goldman to transfer the risk of that $1.2 billion in declining ABX assets 
to its clients, buyers of Hudson securities, while, at the same time, 
choosing an additional $800 million in subprime securities to package, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Id. It is noteworthy here that the even if Goldman held on to the short position 
in Abacus, it still would have run afoul of Section 621 despite the fact investors are 
alleged to be under the impression that ACA selected the underlying portfolio. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 573. 
 51. Id. at 573 (citing Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 5). 
 52. Id. (citing Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 5). 
 53. Id. (citing Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 5). 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 390. ABX is an index 
that charts the performance of U.S. subprime residential mortgage based credit default 
swaps. 
 56. Id. 
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sell, and short.57 Goldman owned the entire short interest in Hudson, 
giving it direct profits if any part of Hudson lost value.58 
To structure the transaction, Goldman established a special purpose 
entity (“SPE”) to issue Hudson securities.59 Using CDS trades, Goldman 
synthetically moved the $1.2 billion in aforementioned assets off its 
books, along with the $800 million worth of additional securities it 
selected, to the SPE.60 Goldman made payments to the SPE in exchange 
for the SPE’s promise to pay Goldman the full value of the referenced 
securities should they default or experience other specified adverse 
credit events.61 Goldman’s payments enabled the SPE to make interest 
payments to long side investors.62 On the short side, Goldman would 
stop making payments on the referenced securities to the SPE at 
specified triggering events such as a mass default on the underlying 
mortgages, then the SPE would stop paying the long investors, and then 
Goldman would begin receiving payments from the SPE.63 It is most 
important to note that Goldman’s interests here are directly opposed to 
those of the long investors, its clients.64 Indeed, Goldman sold long 
interests in the CDO to its clients as investment opportunities as it went 
short on the same CDO.65 In the end, Goldman gleaned a $1.7 billion 
profit from Hudson while one of the largest Hudson investors, Morgan 
Stanley, lost about $960 million.66 
2.  Anderson Mezzanine 2007-1 (“Anderson”) 
Issued March 2007, Anderson was a synthetic CDO referencing 
$305 million worth of BBB and BBB- rated subprime RMBS.67 
Goldman did not select the underlying assets, but instead hired GSC 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 524 (citing Investment Banks Hearing, supra 
note 38). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 525; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 392. 
 67. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 392. 
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Partners, a hedge fund managed by former Goldman employees, to 
perform that task.68 GSC Partners selected the underlying assets and 
Goldman then approved them.69 Goldman owned 40% of the short side 
of Anderson.70 Within seven months of Anderson’s issuance, its 
underlying securities were downgraded by the ratings agencies, and 
almost all of those securities are currently worthless.71 
With an intimate knowledge of the underlying securities, Goldman 
had positioned itself to take advantage of the poor performance of the 
assets underlying Anderson.72 More than 45% of those assets originated 
from a company called New Century.73 The Subcommittee’s report 
notes that Goldman had purchased a number of New Century loans on 
its own, but was in the process of demanding repayment due to the 
loans’ exceptionally poor performance.74 Although Goldman lost money 
on the overall transaction, this loss was in part offset by the $131 million 
it gained via its short positions on the CDO.75 
3. Timberwolf I (“Timberwolf”) 
Timberwolf was a $1 billion hybrid CDO.76 Timberwolf referenced 
56 different A-rated securities from other CDOs, which themselves 
referenced more than 4,500 RMBS securities with less attractive credit 
ratings, generally BBB.77 Like Hudson, Goldman did not select the 
securities that Timberwolf referenced, leaving that task to Greywolf 
Capital Management which, like GSC Partners, is a hedge fund run by 
former Goldman employees.78 Goldman took a short position on 36% of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 393. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 540. 
 76. Id. at 393. 
 77. Id. The fact that Timberwolf referenced CDOs, which themselves referenced 
asset-backed securities makes Timberwolf a hybrid. 
 78. Id. Greywolf selected the assets and submitted them to Goldman for approval. 
Id. at 542. 
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Timberwolf’s securities.79 From that short interest, Goldman made $330 
million at the direct expense of long side investors.80 But, despite the 
earnings from the short position, Goldman lost about $455 million on 
Timberwolf overall due to its inability to sell all the long side shares in 
the structure.81 
 
C. STATEMENTS ABOUT THE GOLDMAN CDOS  
BY SECTION 621’S DRAFTERS 
 
Throughout the legislative history of Section 621, Senators Levin 
and Merkley repeatedly referenced the Goldman CDOs and linked them 
to the need for prevention of material conflicts of interest. This subpart 
examines how Senator Levin’s opening statement at the Investment 
Banks Hearing set the stage for his argument that Goldman’s actions 
involving transactions where it had material conflicts of interest 
contributed to the Financial Crisis. From there, this subpart looks at 
statements during the development and passage of Section 621. From 
this analysis, it is clear that the Goldman CDOs played a major role in 
the justification for Section 621 in the eyes of its drafters. 
In his opening statement at the Investment Banks Hearing, Senator 
Levin explained his understanding of the implications of Goldman’s 
actions regarding the Goldman CDOs. He argued: 
“Goldman’s actions demonstrate that it often saw its clients not as 
valuable customers, but as objects for its own profit. This matters 
because instead of doing well when its clients did well, Goldman 
Sachs did well when its clients lost money. Its conduct brings into 
question the whole function of Wall Street, which traditionally has 
been seen as an engine of growth, betting on America’s successes 
and not its failures.”82 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. Id. at 393. Goldman earned $330 million in revenue from this short position, 
but this only helped to offset the total losses Goldman incurred with Timberwolf. Id. at 
559. In fact, Goldman earned that $330 million along with $3 million in interest while 
losing $562 million on Timberwolf securities it failed to sell and another $226 million 
in securities used to secure the CDO that lost value. Id. In all, Goldman lost $455 
million on Timberwolf. Id. 
 80. Id. at 559. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Investment Banks Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
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Senator Levin’s opening statement frames the issue as one where 
Goldman betrayed its clients for the sake of its own profits.83 According 
to Senator Levin’s remarks, when Goldman realized that subprime 
mortgages were destined to lose value en masse, it packaged them 
together and sold them to long investors (its clients) while it took the 
short side, insisting to those investors that the mortgages were still good 
investments despite Goldman’s own short positions on them.84 
Senator Levin’s floor statements before the Senate further illustrate 
how Goldman’s connection led him to draft Section 621. On May 10, 
2010, Senator Levin, in explaining Section 621, called on the Senate to 
“end to the self-dealing” after saying that his Subcommittee’s 
investigation found that “Goldman Sachs act[ed] as its own secret client, 
betting against its customers.”85 In a May 20, 2010 floor speech, Senator 
Levin echoed the statements from his May 10 speech and then went on 
to characterize the Goldman CDOs and Goldman’s actions surrounding 
them as “one of the most dramatic findings” of his Subcommittee’s 
investigation into the Financial Crisis.86 On July 15, 2010, Senator Levin 
explained to the Senate that Section 621 “addresses the blatant conflicts 
of interest in the underwriting of asset-backed securities highlighted in a 
hearing with Goldman Sachs before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations . . . .”87 Here, it is clear that the Goldman CDOs 
influenced Section 621’s drafters and the Senators who voted to include 
it in the final version of Dodd-Frank. 
After Section 621 was placed into Dodd-Frank and Dodd-Frank 
was signed into law, Senators Levin and Merkley continued to explain 
the significance of their work while linking it back to Goldman and the 
Goldman CDOs. In their policy essay published in Summer 2011, the 
Senators explained: “Hudson Mezzanine and other similar transactions 
represent securities underwriting, derivatives dealing, and proprietary 
trading at their most conflicted. Goldman Sachs intentionally designed 
the product to take a proprietary trading position against the firm’s own 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. Id. (“Goldman Sachs also made out big time in its bet against its own products 
and its own clients.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 156 CONG. REC. S3470 (May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). Note 
Senator Levin’s language faulting Goldman for “secret” actions, implicitly arguing that 
part of the issue is, indeed, a lack of disclosure by Goldman of its short positions. 
 86. 156 CONG. REC. S 4058 (May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 87. 156 CONG. REC. S 5899 (July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
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risky exposure, and it then marketed the CDO it had designed to fail.”88 
Similarly, in an August 2011 letter to Mary Shapiro,89 Chairman of the 
SEC, regarding the implementation of Section 621, the Senators wrote: 
“The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing on Goldman 
Sachs highlighted a blatant example of this practice [firms taking short 
positions on securities they structure or sell]: the firm assembled asset-
backed securities, sold those securities to clients, bet against them, and 
then profited from the failures.”90 Thus, the Senators asked that the SEC 
draft “regulations implementing [S]ection 621 . . . [that] put an end to 
those conflict-ridden practices.”91 Again, in presenting the purpose and 
goals of Section 621, whether to the general public and legal community 
in the Policy Essay or the regulators charged with drafting the rules 
implementing Section 621 in the Letter to Chairman Shapiro, Senators 
Merkley and Levin were steadfast in linking Section 621 back to the 
Goldman CDOs. 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
Section 621 is part of the Merkley-Levin Provisions, which are part 
of the Dodd-Frank Act.92 As relevant to Section 621, Dodd-Frank’s core 
goals are to protect: 1) the U.S. economy from suffering another 
debilitating financial crisis; and 2) taxpayers from again being called 
upon to rescue failed financial firms.93 Adding Sections 619-621 to 
Dodd-Frank, the Merkley-Levin Provisions amend and augment Dodd-
Frank as originally proposed, and in doing so, seek to “strengthen [it] by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 525. Immediately after, the Senators 
reemphasized their point: “Goldman Sachs, pursuing its own self-interest, created a 
product so that it could obtain the short exposure it wanted and then sold the long 
exposure to clients. It not only bet against its clients; it loaded the dice.” Id. The 
Senators’ reference to “load[ing] the dice” is similar to the casino example at Part I, 
supra, though here the Senators accuse Goldman of cheating and not simply taking an 
adverse or conflicted position. 
 89. Merkley-Levin Letter, supra note 19, is addressed to the heads of all the 
agencies responsible for drafting the regulations implementing the Merkley-Levin 
Provisions. Because the SEC will write the rules implementing Section 621, only Mary 
Shapiro is listed for the purposes of this essay. 
 90. Merkley-Levin Letter, supra note 19. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 532. 
 93. See supra note 1; Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 515. 
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seeking to limit the damage . . . proprietary transactions can inflict on 
[the] economy and end the conflicts of interest which too often 
accompany them.”94 Both Senator Levin and Senator Merkley 
participated extensively in investigating the causes of the Financial 
Crisis and responding to them.95 Their work in the investigation 
informed the process of drafting and enacting the Merkley-Levin 
Provisions.96 
Senator Levin’s involvement began in November 2008, when the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’ 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator Levin, 
began its investigation into the “key causes” of the Financial Crisis with 
the goals of creating a record of facts, informing legislative discourse 
about the need for financial reforms, and helping to protect ordinary 
Americans from the excesses of Wall Street.97 In Spring 2010, Senator 
Levin’s Subcommittee held four hearings, each on a different “root” 
cause of the Financial Crisis.98 One of those hearings, examining 
“Investment Banking Abuses,” dealt closely with Goldman and the 
Subcommittee required CEO Lloyd Blankfein and Tourre, among 
others, to testify.99 In April 2011, Senator Levin’s Subcommittee issued 
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis, a report that extensively details the 
findings of the Subcommittee’s investigation into the causes of the 
Financial Crisis.100 
Senator Merkley traces his involvement to Spring 2009, when he 
raised the issue of proprietary trading among banks in hearings 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. 156 CONG. REC. S3470 (May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 95. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 1; Investment Banks 
Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“Our Subcommittee’s goal is to 
construct a record of the facts in order to deepen public understanding of what went 
wrong; to inform the ongoing legislative debate about the need for financial reform; and 
to provide a foundation for building better defenses to protect Main Street from the 
excesses of Wall Street.”). 
 98. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 2. 
 99. Id. at 7-10; see also Sachs and the Shitty: A Ghastly Day on Capital Hill for 
Goldman’s Top Brass, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16 
009137. 
 100. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5. 
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conducted by the Senate Banking Committee.101 By Summer 2009, 
Senator Merkley was collaborating with Paul Volcker, Chairman of the 
President’s Economic Advisor Board, on issues concerning proprietary 
trading.102 As result of the collaboration, a proposal was made for the 
Government Accountability Office to study the issue of proprietary 
trading.103 Eventually, this study became a springboard for the Volcker 
Rule, which is Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act.104 
Senator Dodd’s original financial reform bill did not contain any 
restrictions on proprietary trading, although it did contain the study on 
the topic requested by Senator Merkley.105 On February 2, 2010, 
Chairman Volcker argued for restrictions on proprietary trades and the 
conflicts of interest that often accompany such trades in testimony 
before the Senate Banking Committee.106 On March 4, 2010 the 
Treasury Department released its proposal regarding the method for 
enacting Volcker’s suggestions, and the proposal did not mention 
conflicts of interest.107 On March 10, 2010, Senators Levin and Merkley, 
along with three colleagues, introduced Protect our Recovery through 
Oversight of Proprietary Trading Act (“PROP” Trading Act), their 
version of the Volcker Rules.108 Among other changes to the Treasury 
proposal, the PROP Trading Act included the prohibition on material 
conflicts of interest contained in the final Section 621.109 Despite the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 531 (citing Establishing a Framework for 
Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 37 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley)). 
 102. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 531-32. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 535-37. 
 105. Id. at 532 (citing Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, 111th 
Cong. § 989 (2009) (Discussion Draft)). 
 106. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank 
Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 5-8, 49-53 (2010) (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman, 
President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board). These restrictions were dubbed the 
Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule is embodied by Dodd-Frank Section 619, the first of 
the Merkley-Levin Provisions. See 156 CONG. REC. S5894 (July 15, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Jeffrey Merkley). 
 107. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 533-34. 
 108. PROP Trading Act, S. 3098, 111th Cong. § 6 (2010). 
 109. Id. § 27B(a)(1) (amending the Securities Act of 1933). Interestingly, the PROP 
Trading Act is stricter than Section 621, as it contains a catchall clause prohibiting any 
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PROP Trading Act, Senator Dodd revised his financial reform bill to 
include a modified version of the Treasury Proposal, which prompted 
Senators Merkley and Levin, flanked by over twenty co-sponsors, to 
introduce on May 10, 2010 a modified version of PROP as an 
amendment to Sen. Dodd’s bill.110 Following successful reconciliation, 
the Merkley-Levin Provisions were incorporated into the final version of 
Dodd-Frank.111 
In explaining the rationale behind Section 621, Senator Levin was 
clear that the Subcommitte’s investigation had a profound effect on the 
development of the rule. Senator Levin stated Section 621 “address[es] 
one of the most dramatic findings of [the Subcommittee on 
Investigations],” which was that “firms [were] betting against financial 
instruments they are assembling and selling.”112 He specifically 
mentioned Goldman, arguing that Goldman was “betting against its 
customers.”113 
IV. SECTION 621 RUNS COUNTER TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION, WHICH ALREADY REGULATE 
MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Authorities are clear that the bedrock of federal securities 
regulation is disclosure. In enacting the major securities statutes, 
Congress rejected the so-called merit-based approach to securities 
regulation, the approach espoused in many state securities laws, which 
allows the government to approve of each and every offering on its 
merits (i.e. assess the actual qualities possessed by the securities 
offered). Instead, Congress opted for a disclosure-based approach. The 
logic behind the disclosure approach employed by Congress is that 
proper disclosure allows investors to make informed decisions about 
their purchases while market forces decide what is and what is not an 
acceptable investment. 
At the same time, information barriers are worthwhile tools already 
used in federal securities regulation in the context of conflicts of 
                                                                                                                 
 
conflict of interest that would “undermine the value, risk, or performance of the asset-
backed security.” Id. § 27B(a)(2). 
 110. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 535-37. 
 111. Id. at 537-38. 
 112. 156 CONG. REC. S3470 (May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 113. Id. 
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interest. By keeping information within companies separate in response 
to or in anticipation of conflicts of interest, regulators are able to prevent 
misuse of information. 
This section uses the aforementioned aspects of the securities laws 
to show why Section 621 is not only a misfit among existing principles 
of securities regulation but also why it should be modified, in light of 
these principles. 
A. THE BEDROCK OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION IS DISCLOSURE 
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress created the two 
fundamental federal statutes governing securities offerings and market 
trading, the Securities Act of 1993 (the “Securities Act”)114 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).115 Among other 
reasons, these statutes were enacted to prevent another depression or 
similar financial disaster.116 The two statutes create a series of 
mandatory disclosure requirements for businesses that wish to issue or 
trade securities in certain contexts.117 This is because the statutes’ 
drafters focused on disclosure, determining it was the preferred method 
to ensure the markets were well-regulated and functional.118 The 
disclosure premise of the securities laws seeks to create information 
parity between buyers and sellers, which allows the securities in the 
market to reach their fair market value as efficiently as possible.119 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2006). 
 115. Id. § 78a et seq. 
 116. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1223-36 (1999). 
 117. Id. Williams identifies four categories of disclosure under these laws: 1) the 
Securities Act requires initial disclosure in association with the first offering for sale of 
a security to public; 2) the Exchange Act requires quarterly (also called “periodic”) 
reporting on securities; 3) proxy disclosures are required in connection with elections 
conducted at shareholders’ meetings; 4) disclosure is required in connection with 
certain events such as mergers, tender offers, or sales of the business. Id. at 1207. 
 118. See AM. JUR. 2D Securities § 60. 
 119. See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 254 (1973) (“Congressional committees 
have stressed the importance of providing full information for both the buyer and the 
seller . . . . The concept of a free and open market for securities necessarily implies that 
the buyer and seller are acting in the exercise of enlightened judgment as to what 
constitutes a fair price . . . . The objective of a fair market cannot be achieved when one 
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SEC’s website today bears this credo when describing the SEC’s 
purpose and the philosophy of federal securities regulation.120 
Perhaps the most famous edification of disclosure comes from 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who wrote: “Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”121 In 
developing the securities laws, Congress rejected arguments for merit-
based regulation, popular among states securities regulatory regimes at 
the time, which would have allowed government approve of each and 
every offering on its merits, and other more stringent regulation of 
securities in favor of the eventual disclosure-based approach.122 In doing 
so, Congress decided that investors and markets were protected 
sufficiently by full and fair disclosure.123 In other words, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 
of the parties to the transaction has inside information unavailable to the other.”) 
(quotations omitted). 
 120. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/wh 
atwedo.shtml (“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United 
States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large 
institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an 
investment . . . .”) (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
 121. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (1914), available at http://ia600309.us.archive.org/32/items/otherpeoplesmone00bra 
n/otherpeoplesmone00bran.pdf. Though he was not directly involved in drafting either 
statute because he was sitting on the Supreme Court by the 1930s, Justice Brandies had 
great influence on then-Professor Felix Frankfurter and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, who were both instrumental in the development of the statutes. See 
Williams, supra note 116, at 1212-13. 
 122. See LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 32-45 (Aspen 5th ed. 2004) (explaining that Justice 
Brandeis’s disclosure approach was picked instead of then-Professor William O. 
Douglas’s arguments for greater control over the securities markers); THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW I.A (2003) (“After considerable debate, Congress 
decided not to adopt the merit regulatory approach of the state acts, opting instead for a 
system of full disclosure.”). 
  Despite this history of a disclosure-based approach, there is support for 
installing the merit approach at the federal level. See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, The 
Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit 
Review, 44 U. RICH L. REV. 647 (2010). 
 123. HAZEN, supra note 122, at I.A; AM. JUR. 2D Securities § 60 (“The basic 
objective of the Securities Act is to protect the public, securities investors, and domestic 
securities markets, from the manipulation of stock prices, by requiring, particularly in 
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employed a philosophy of regulating what could or needed to be said 
about securities to their purchasers and the public, rather than 
implementing a regime that regulated the quality of securities offered for 
sale.124 In fact, the disclosure regime allows investors to sell risky or 
even unsafe securities as long as proper disclosure is made.125 This 
underlying philosophy of disclosure is recognized by the Supreme Court 
throughout its canon.126 
B. EXISTING LAW ON FRAUD AND MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS AND 
OMISSIONS SUFFICIENTLY GOVERNS MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
There are several provisions under the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act and associated rules that provide investors and the SEC 
with a cause of action for alleged violations of the securities laws.127 
Although a detailed analysis of the various provisions and rules is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note the basic 
principles here to frame the allegations made by the SEC and investors 
discussed below. These laws are premised on protecting investors from 
fraud and focus on the materiality of the disclosures they require. For 
liability to be imposed for a misstatement or omission regarding a 
security, that misstatement or omission must relate to a “material 
fact.”128 The SEC’s rules governing Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities 
Act states that a fact is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to 
purchase the security” at issue.129 Similarly, although the SEC has not 
expressly defined “material fact” under Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
                                                                                                                 
 
regard to the initial distribution of securities, full disclosure of information thought 
necessary to informed investment decisions.”). 
 124. HAZEN, supra note 122, at I.A. 
 125. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1801 (2011). 
 126. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (“The design of 
the [Securities Act] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information 
thought necessary to informed investment decisions.”); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 
646 (1988) (“[T]he purpose . . . of the [Securities] Act . . . [is] to promote full and fair 
disclosure of information to the public in the sales of securities.”). 
 127. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i, 77q, 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2009). 
 128. 14 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA Corporations § 6862 (2011). 
 129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. 
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Act (and Rule 10b-5130 by extension) courts have stated a fact is material 
“if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been 
considered significant by a reasonable investor” in deciding whether or 
not to purchase or sell the security in question.131 Failure to disclose a 
conflict of interest has produced liability because conflicts of interest 
have been found by courts to be material.132 
Rule 10b-5 is the primary remedy for securities suits stemming 
from allegations of fraud.133 This Rule is especially expansive because it 
covers any purchase or sale of any security by any person, unlike other 
causes of action under the securities laws which generally deal with 
registered offerings or mandatory disclosure statements.134 Rule 10b-5 
implicates fraud and therefore requiresa showing of scienter, or “intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”135 There is disharmony among the 
circuit courts, but some circuits recognize “severe” or “fact-specific” 
recklessness as sufficient to show scienter.136 One of the main purposes 
of Rule 10b-5 is to achieve information parity in the market by 
eliminating insider trading.137 
Subparts i-iii explain how the allegations made by the government 
against Goldman fall under these traditional causes of action made 
pursuant to the securities laws.138 These Subparts further highlight 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. Id. § 240.10b5-1. 
 131. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988). 
 132. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir.1970) 
(“[F]ailure to inform the customer fully of its possible conflict of interest . . . was an 
omission of material fact . . . .”). 
 133. HAZEN, supra note 122, at IV.E. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976). 
 136. See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 
1999) (discussing circuit split). 
 137. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 
(2d Cir. 1974) (Rule 10b-5 is “based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the 
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have 
relatively equal access to material information.”) (citation omitted). 
 138. There is an argument to be made here that such allegations and lawsuits had to 
be made pursuant to established securities laws because there was no prohibition on 
material conflicts of interest until Section 621 became law. While I agree that these 
allegations would, of course, have to be tailored to the law in effect at the time the 
allegations were made, my point is not simply that the existing securities laws can be 
used to fashion such allegations. My point here, rather, is that the securities laws 
provide a sufficient, and even preferable, basis for doing so. 
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private litigation and SEC regulatory action against Goldman and 
another defendant for alleged securities laws violations. 
1.  The Government’s Allegations Against Goldman Implicate 
Traditional Securities Laws 
The government’s allegations surrounding the Abacus transaction 
directly implicate existing securities laws. On April 16, 2010, the SEC 
filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York against Goldman 
and Tourre under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act.139 The allegations stem from misstatements and 
fraud.140 Specifically, the government alleged: 1) failure to disclose 
Paulson’s involvement in the portfolio selection process to Abacus 
buyers; 2) failure to disclose Paulson’s short interest to ACA; 3) 
misrepresenting that Paulson had a long interest to ACA; 4) failure to 
disclose Paulson’s involvement in the portfolio selection process to the 
ratings agencies; and 5) failure to disclose Paulson’s short interest to 
long investors in light of its role in structuring the portfolio.141 
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis makes several allegations of 
securities laws violations against Goldman relating to disclosure and 
fraud in its communications with buyers of Hudson securities. First, it is 
alleged that Goldman’s marketing materials stated that Goldman’s 
interests were aligned with long investors because Goldman was slated 
to purchase part of Hudson’s equity tranche.142 Second, it is alleged that 
Goldman failed to mention that it was shorting the entire portfolio 
referenced by Hudson.143 Third, it is alleged that Goldman led investors 
to believe that the portfolio referenced by Hudson was picked by neutral 
parties when the portfolio was actually picked by Goldman and, 
furthermore, $1.2 billion of the portfolio came straight off of Goldman’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 67-74. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391 (quotation omitted); 
Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 525. 
 143. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391. Despite this 
representation, Goldman did disclose that it “may” invest short in Hudson. Id. Thus, 
Goldman disclosed that it had the potential to be short when, in fact, it was short. For a 
discussion about why Goldman’s actions here are insufficient disclosure under 
emerging federal case law, see infra Part V.C. 
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books.144 Fourth, it is alleged that Goldman did not disclose that all 
assets referenced by Hudson were priced by Goldman and not by 
referencing third party sales of those assets.145 Fifth, it is alleged that the 
Subcommittee’s report evidences that Goldman dragged its feet in 
responding to client requests that it begin selling Hudson assets that 
were declining in value because Goldman’s short position was gaining 
more value as the assets declined.146 
Again, like Abacus and Hudson, Anatomy of a Financial Collapse 
makes a number allegations under existing securities laws against 
Goldman for its actions relating to Anderson. First, it is alleged that 
despite Goldman’s understanding that New Century, the originator of 
many of the underlying mortgages referenced by Anderson, was in 
financial trouble and that Goldman was in the process of demanding 
repayments of many loans on its books from New Century, Goldman did 
not disclose its own negative views of New Century to potential long 
investors in Anderson.147 Second, it is alleged that Goldman actually 
claimed to be “comfortable” with New Century’s products and even 
issued talking points to sales staff aimed at assuaging potential clients’ 
fears about the company.148 Third, it is alleged that Goldman did not 
disclose its short position in Anderson.149 Fourth, it is alleged that not 
only did Goldman fail to disclose its short position, but it actually led 
investors to believe it had a 50% stake in Anderson’s equity tranche, 
meaning it was long on Anderson.150 Fifth, it is alleged that Goldman 
did not tell investors that it nearly cancelled Anderson due to falling 
values of the structure’s underlying securities.151 
The Subcommittee’s report is critical of Goldman’s actions 
involving Timberwolf on many fronts, but it does not outline many 
strong securities laws violations.152 The strongest allegation in the report 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391; Policy Essay, 
supra note 7, at 525. 
 145. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391. 
 146. Id. at 391-92. 
 147. Id. at 393. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 541. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Although Timberwolf seems to have the least clear violations of securities laws 
when compared to the other examined Goldman CDOs and Timberwolf resulted in a 
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regarding Timberwolf is that Goldman withheld its short position from 
investors.153 It is also alleged that Goldman failed to disclose its internal 
analyses showing that Timberwolf was losing value.154 Anatomy of a 
Financial Collapse also provides examples to support its allegations that 
Goldman “targeted” its sales towards clients inexperienced with 
purchasing CDOs, while at the same time offering those customers as 
little information on Timberwolf as possible.155 
2. Some Goldman CDOs Result in Prosecution and Settlement Under 
Existing Securities Laws 
In July 2010, Goldman settled with the SEC ending its portion of 
the Abacus case.156 In the settlement Goldman agreed to pay $535 
million in civil penalties and disgorge $15 million.157 Although 
Goldman did not admit or deny the complaint’s allegations, the 
settlement stated that Goldman’s failure to disclose Paulson’s role in the 
portfolio selection process was a “mistake” because Paulson’s interests 
were adverse to the CDO’s other investors.158 Although Goldman’s lack 
of admissions fails to provide collateral opportunities for private 
                                                                                                                 
 
net loss for Goldman, Timberwolf does present the report’s authors with several 
excellent storylines in furtherance of condemning Goldman. First, the report details two 
victims of Timberwolf: a Korean life insurance company that had no experience in the 
CDO market and an Australian hedge fund that went bankrupt in part from its exposure 
to Timberwolf. Id. at 549-55. Second, an eminently quotable email, featuring a 
Goldman trader calling Timberwolf “one shitty deal,” came to represent the sentiment 
of many at Goldman about the long side of the transaction. Id. at 395, 554, 561. Senator 
Levin continually quoted the email in berating its author’s supervisor. See Brian 
Montopoli, Levin Repeatedly References “Sh**ty Deal” at Goldman Hearing, CBS 
NEWS, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20003526-
503544.html. 
 153. Id. at 559. 
 154. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 559. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & 
Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010); see also Press Release, SEC, Goldman 
Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime 
Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm 
[hereinafter SEC Goldman Settlement Press Release]. 
 157. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010). 
 158. Id. 
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litigants (i.e. the long-side investors harmed by Abacus’s failure),159 
Goldman’s civil penalty is remarkable because of its size as compared to 
the actual profits it gleaned from the transaction. The civil penalty was 
the largest settlement ever assessed by the SEC against a financial 
services firm and its size dwarfs the $15 million in actual profits that 
Goldman gained from Abacus.160 It is unclear what the outcome will be 
for Tourre because as of the settlement date his case was still pending.161 
Likewise, private actions against Goldman regarding Abacus have also 
been initiated.162 
Goldman also faces liability in a variety of private lawsuits, 
including class actions and derivative suits, stemming from the other 
CDOs examined in this comment.163 In fact, these lawsuits, when 
combined, seek to collect $15.8 billion in rescission alone from 
Goldman.164 In a regulatory filing, Goldman classifies such suits as 
“generally alleging that the offering documents for the securities . . . 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Settlements that contain admissions can, in certain situations, be used against 
the admitting party in subsequent actions by plaintiffs harmed by the same 
circumstances giving rise to the settled case. See generally 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 4443 (West 2d Ed. 2011) 
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 160. See SEC Goldman Settlement Press Release, supra note 156. One federal judge 
even remarked upon the size of this penalty in deciding that settlement in a similar case 
brought by the SEC, discussed infra at Part V.B.iii, was insufficient. See Order and 
Opinion 13 n.7, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 28, 2011) (Rakoff, J.) [hereinafter Citigroup Order]. In other words, the size of 
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 161. See SEC Goldman Settlement Press Release, supra note 156. See also Docket, 
SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010). 
 162. See, e.g., ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/2011 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 6, 2011). In this case, Goldman responds, inter alia, to ACA’s 
complaint of fraud and material misstatements by asserting that Paulson’s investment 
strategy is not a material fact and therefore, did not need to be. Goldman further 
responded that ACA never asked Goldman or Paulson for information regarding 
Paulson’s position. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs 
& Co., No. 650027/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2011). This motion has not yet been 
decided. 
 163. See, e.g., ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/2011 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 6, 2011). 
 164. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 96 (Nov. 
8, 2011). 
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contained untrue statements of material facts and material omissions” 
and furthermore “[c]ertain of these complaints allege fraud and seek 
punitive damages.”165 From this, it seems clear that traditional securities 
laws have provided an ample basis for both the government and private 
litigants to sue Goldman for perceived misdeeds surrounding the 
conflicted CDOs that gave rise to Section 621. 
3. Cases Similar to the Goldman CDOs Result in Prosecution Under 
Existing Securities Laws 
On October 19, 2011, the SEC filed a Complaint against Citigroup 
Global Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”) for securities laws violations 
involving circumstances similar to the Goldman CDOs described in this 
Comment.166 The Complaint alleged that Citigroup had selected a series 
of mortgage-backed securities from its own books that it believed would 
perform poorly.167 From there, it is alleged that Citigroup packaged 
those assets and others into a CDO and proceeded to sell long interests 
in that CDO, labeling them strong investments and representing to 
investors that it had hired an independent advisor to select the CDO’s 
underlying assets.168 On the same day that it filed the complaint, the 
SEC asked the District Court to approve a consent judgment to settle the 
case where Citigroup would disgorge $160 million in profits gleaned 
from the CDO, pay $30 million in interest owed on those profits, and 
pay a civil penalty of $95 million.169 The consent judgment did not 
require Citigroup to admit or deny any of the allegations in the 
complaint.170 The presiding judge, the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, refused 
to sign the consent judgment for a number of reasons stemming from the 
SEC’s not requiring Citigroup to admit any of the allegations in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 
19, 2011). The SEC specifically charged violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 
Securities Act. Complaint ¶ 65, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 
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 167. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 2, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011). 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 58. 
 169. Citigroup Order, supra note 160, at 3. 
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complaint.171 Despite the fact that there is not yet a conclusion in this 
case, the point to be made is that the SEC can use the existing securities 
laws to bring enforcement actions against defendants for perceived 
misdeeds associated with similar conflicts of interest as those described 
in this Comment. Again, the actual misdeed comes from lack of 
disclosure and misstatements about the conflict of interest rather than 
anything inherently wrong with the conflict of interest. 
C. A FEDERAL COURT’S DECISION CONCERNING DISCLOSURE OF 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CAN BE APPLIED TO THE GOLDMAN CDOS 
In 2006, the SEC convinced a Central District of California court 
that a defendant made material misstatements in violation of Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act for stating that his company’s employees “may” have an 
interest in the securities that the defendant’s company recommended via 
its website when the defendant “knew” his employees actually “had a 
biased interest” in those securities.172 The decision allows for liability 
under the securities laws for making an assertion that one may 
potentially have a conflict of interest with the buyer that person actually 
knows that such a conflict of interest already exists or intends for it to 
exist in the future.173 The Czuczko decision relies on SEC v. Blavin, a 
Sixth Circuit decision where liability was found when the issuer of an 
investment newsletter stated its employees “may” trade in stocks the 
newsletter recommended, thusgiving the impression that the newsletter’s 
management was unsure of this practice, when in fact the newsletter was 
owned as a sole proprietorship and the owner indeed held interests in the 
recommended stocks.174 
Applying the case to the Goldman CDOs, Anatomy of a Financial 
Crisis cites Czuczko quite broadly: “A federal court has held that 
disclosing a potential adverse interest, when a known adverse interest 
already exists, can constitute a material misstatement to investors.”175 
This differs from the analysis at Part IV.B supra because the Czuczko 
Court goes a step further in holding that disclosure of a potential conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Id. at 15. 
 172. SEC v. Czuczko, No. CV 06-4792, slip op. at 8, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007). 
 173. Id. 
 174. 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 175. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 617. 
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of interest is not proper when an actual conflict of interest exists.176 The 
analysis at Part IV.B supra only dealt with general lack of disclosure of 
a conflict of interest.177 It is important to note that many boilerplate 
disclosures include language of unspecific potential conflicts of interest. 
An example of such a disclosure is found in the promotional materials 
for Hudson, which only disclosed Goldman’s potential to have a conflict 
of interest with the long investors when Goldman, in fact, already had an 
actual conflict of interest.178 
There are limits to Czuczko’s utility in finding liability in the cases 
of the Goldman CDOs or transactions that involve similar facts. It is 
unclear whether further application will be made to the Goldman CDOs 
because litigation involving these products is only at the early stages. 
More importantly, the Czuczko decision has not been relied upon by any 
federal courts to date.179 Thus, if this decision is to have any further 
application to the Goldman CDOs or similar cases, it is currently at the 
nascent stage. 
D. EXISTING LAW CONCERNING INFORMATION BARRIERS CAN BE 
APPLIED TO THE MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT SECTION 621 
SEEKS TO PREVENT 
Existing securities laws and case law seek to prevent conflicts of 
interest in some circumstances by requiring institutions to adopt 
information barriers.180 These barriers are systematic, self-enforced 
policies and structures, commonly called “Chinese walls” or “ethical 
walls,” designed to stop the flow of information between the 
institutions’ various units in order to prevent conflicts of interest.181 One 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. SEC v. Czuczko, No. CV 06-4792, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007). 
 177. See supra Part IV.B. 
 178. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5. at 617-18, 624; (citing 
Goldman Sachs, Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 LTD. Offering Circular at 56 (Dec. 3, 
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 179. The decision remains unpublished in the Federal Reporter and Federal 
Appendix and unavailable on the two major electronic databases, Lexis and Westlaw. 
Furthermore, searches for citations to Czuczko in either law review articles or case 
citations on both Lexis and Westlaw yielded no results. 
 180. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 76o(g) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2) (2009). 
 181. The wall is “a self-enforced informational barrier consisting of systematic, as 
opposed to ad hoc, procedural and structural arrangements . . . designed to stem the 
flow of knowledge . . . between different divisions within a multi-capacity financial 
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use of such barriers is to prevent firms from utilizing material non-
public information they glean from one business unit as a way to trade 
on insider information via another business unit.182 In fact, Section 15(f) 
of the Exchange Act requires Broker-Dealers to institute policies and 
procedures to prevent the spread of material non-public information 
among the various units of their firms.183 At the same time, Rule 10b-
5184 promulgates a defense to insider trading allegations when a 
defendant can show that an effective information barrier exists and the 
person making the trade was not aware that others at the firm were in 
possession of the material non-public information.185 These existing 
tools would do much to protect buyers from the same transactions that 
Section 621 seeks to prevent. 
If effective information barriers were in place, “designed to fail” 
transactions would have limited purpose in aiding the firms that 
structure them. When a firm’s trading unit is unaware that the same 
firm’s financial products structuring unit has designed a specific 
transaction to fail, the trading unit cannot go short on the transaction 
with any certainty of a return. Although this is a simplification, it holds 
up against the Goldman CDOs if they are to serve as an example. In 
Abacus, Tourre contacted all the major players in the deal, helped 
structure the transaction, and then sold the product to investors.186 
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 186. See supra Part III.A. 
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Likewise, the Goldman units that structured Hudson, Anderson, and 
Timberwolf all did so with some intent that Goldman was to short those 
products.187 Furthermore, Goldman structuring units, according to 
Congress, aggressively pushed Goldman’s selling units to peddle the 
products while knowing Goldman had a short position.188 Without 
knowing such products were structured to fail, Goldman could not be as 
certain of getting return. 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
Thus far, this Comment has described the events prompting the 
creation of Section 621 and explained why those events implicate and 
are sufficiently regulated by traditional securities laws. In Part VI.A, this 
Comment argues that outright ban on securities affected by material 
conflicts of interest is not an appropriate solution. This Part also 
introduces the notion of a disclosure requirement for material conflicts 
of interest in the sale and distribution of securities affected by them. 
This requirement would aid in creating information parity in such 
transactions while alerting buyers to conflicts of interest. IPart IV.B, I 
highlights ways that such a requirement could be promulgated in light of 
the current Section 621 and the rule proposed by the SEC implementing 
Section 621. From there, this Partproposes the best method, adding a 
disclosure exemption to the SEC’s rule implementing Section 621, for 
achieving this result and dismissing the other solutions examined. 
Finally, Part VI.B.iv.a, provides a recommended draft of this SEC Rule 
with an explanation. 
A. DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND 
UNDERLYING INFORMATION IS PREFERABLE TO AN OUTRIGHT BAN ON 
SECURITIES AFFECTED BY SUCH CONFLICTS 
The market for securities is based on legitimate differences 
between participants. Material conflicts of interest do not change this 
fact. Furthermore, as described above, Section 621’s categorical ban 
clashes with the securities laws because it eliminates the transactions it 
governs rather than facilitating them via disclosure requirements. 
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Disclosure requirements here would better allow buyers to understand 
their purchases and help the market make its own decision about the 
value and appropriateness of transactions affected by material conflicts 
of interest. 
1. Markets Are Driven By Competing Views and Material Conflicts of 
Interest Do Not Change This Principle 
The capital markets exist largely so that a variety of positions can 
be taken by market participants based on their various tolerances for 
uncertainty.189 In other words, the markets allow participants with 
differing views of the value and the potential value of securities to 
increase or decrease their exposure to such price fluctuations without 
regard for whether a participant has a negative or positive view of such 
value.190 Participants that have legitimate disagreements over the values 
of securities, for any number of reasons, can come together and enter 
into contracts that allow them manage their exposure to such 
securities.191 Indeed, parties can and will have differing views about the 
quality and prospects of many investments.192 Even in light of a material 
conflict of interest between the structurer and seller of such investments, 
incentives to make trades will still exist.193 Accordingly, an outright ban 
on such transactions is not preferable when disclosure and curing of 
information asymmetries can be regulated. 
2. Adequate Disclosure 
Parties can have competing views about the prospects and value of 
an investment, but more is needed to facilitate their investment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 189. See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of 
Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 532-33 (2009) (“The capital and insurance 
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relationship.194 Building on the principles of the securities laws, 
adequate disclosure is the best method to facilitate investment.195 If 
sellers and structurers provided the underlying information196 they used 
in their development of the securities being sold, then the goal of 
information parity would be furthered.197 If counterparties have access to 
the same information as the party that designed a security to fail, all that 
remains is a true difference of opinion or other motivations to make the 
trade. Because the parties are privy to the same information when proper 
disclosure is made, the securities law would deem that both parties have 
adequate information for assessing the value of the underlying security 
regardless of any material conflict of interest.198 
There are two primary ways to promulgate a disclosure requirement 
in the context of material conflicts of interest. One way to structure this 
requirement would be to create a fiduciary relationship triggered by a 
material conflict of interest created by the structurer or seller of a 
security.199 In essence, the structurer or seller who bets against its own 
securities would have a fiduciary duty to the buyer mandating disclosure 
of the information it has about those securities along with its status of 
any potential material conflict of interest.200 Another solution would be 
keep Section 621’s ban on material conflicts of interest but add a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
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disclosure exemption to the rule. In that instance, transactions involving 
securities affected by material conflicts of interest would still be banned 
unless adequate disclosures were made to the buyer. Part VI.B, 
highlights the most effective way to promulgate such a disclosure 
exemption. 
3. Investors Can and Should Price Risk Associated with Material 
Conflicts of Interest into Their Agreements if Adequate Disclosure Is 
Made 
Once the conflict of interest and relevant underlying information 
are disclosed, buyers can price the risk associated with them.201 Buyers 
here have several options depending on their ability to understand and 
value the assets underlying the securities affected by the material 
conflict of interest. This Section examines three instances where buyers 
can attempt to place values on securities affected by material conflicts of 
interest. In all instances, disclosure allows buyers to arrive at appropriate 
resolutions. 
In the first instance, buyers who are confident in their 
understanding of the conflicted securities can use the supplied 
information about underlying assets and price accordingly.202 Buyers do 
this knowing the conflicted seller or structurer was required to disclose 
all the relevant information about the structure’s underlying assets.203 As 
such, information parity is more closely achieved and the conflicted 
structurer or seller and buyer merely have differing opinions about the 
prospects of the securities being sold.204 
In the second instance, buyers who are not confident in their ability 
to judge the prospects of the securities affected by the conflict of interest 
based on the disclosed information may still want to purchase the 
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affected securities.205 Here, they can price the very notion of the conflict 
of interest into their investment decision.206 If most buyers find 
themselves in this situation, the market could face an adverse selection 
or “lemon” problem, where legitimate products on the market are 
devalued because buyers cannot parse them from similar but somehow 
defective or less desirable counterparts due to information asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers.207 There, even legitimate, higher quality 
securities will be undervalued due to the conflicts of interest they entail. 
To differentiate themselves from sellers and structurers who have 
designed their transactions to fail, legitimate structurers and sellers 
could take additional steps toward providing information parity and 
assurances.208 While there are anticipated counterarguments that such 
additional disclosure places a burden on legitimate firms, it is important 
to remember that for the lemon problem to become pervasive, an 
inability to evaluate the offered products must be widespread among 
buyers.209 Therefore, once the lemon problem starts to affect legitimate 
sellers and structurers and possibly burden them, it is because there is 
such a lack of understanding of their offerings in the market that the 
market is demanding they take further action.210 More simply put, 
legitimate sellers or structurers of securities affected by conflicts of 
interest would not become burdened as a result of the lemon problem 
until the market actually demanded that they act to differentiate 
themselves.211 
In the third instance, buyers unable to make sense of the disclosed 
information, but alarmed by the existence of a material conflict of 
interest would simply abstain from purchasing the securities. Knowing 
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the parameters of the potential investment and their ability to value it, 
the buyer decides the risk of being fleeced is too strong.212 While certain 
buyers will miss the opportunity to participate in legitimate transactions, 
others will not experience losses from their investments and later sue to 
recoup their losses based on claims of non-disclosure, misstatements, 
and fraud. 
B. RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION 
This final Part discusses several alternatives and their limitations, 
and presents this Comment’s ultimate recommendation. 
1. Dismissing Information Barriers 
If implemented effectively, information barriers would address the 
most salient concerns about material conflicts of interest.213 That is, 
information barriers would create a more “equal” scenario because both 
seller and buyer would be unaware of the seller’s short position.214 But 
the drawbacks of information barriers make them an unfavorable 
solution here. The arguments in this Comment highlighting the notion 
that there is nothing inherently nefarious with material conflicts of 
interest if proper disclosure accompanies them render it difficult to 
justify information barriers, which are an extreme implementation.215 
Furthermore, information barriers prevent many of the legitimate 
purposes that transactions affected by material conflicts can serve, 
discussed in this Comment.216 Finally, it would be remiss to fail to 
mention that there is some debate as to the effectiveness of information 
barriers when put in place.217 Thus, a disclosure requirement is a more 
effective and streamlined way to deal with this problem 
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2. Relying on Federal Case Law is Inadequate Without Increased 
Disclosure Requirements 
Although current law considers a conflict of interest to be 
“material” and requires disclosure in instances where it exists, there are 
many instances where firms use boilerplate language to warn about the 
possibility of such a conflict existing later.218 Similarly, this law is 
incomplete because it deals mostly with disclosing conflicts as they 
occur.219 And while the Czuczko opinion, discussed at Part V.C supra, 
makes clear that disclosure of a potential conflict when an actual 
conflict is already present constitutes an actionable misstatement of 
material fact, it still fails to address the situation where a conflict 
legitimately develops after the sale of the security.220 Furthermore, the 
decision remains unpublished and has not been cited by any federal 
courts to date.221 Thus, relying on this case law and waiting for, or 
depending on, it to develop is counterintuitive and unlikely to provide 
any near term solutions. At the same time, it is unlikely to fully address 
the problem at hand. 
3. Establishment of a Fiduciary Duty Is Cumbersome 
Establishing a fiduciary duty for any party with a material conflict 
of interest could also be a method of requiring disclosure of conflicts of 
interest and reducing information asymmetry. Such an obligation would 
be modeled on the fiduciary duty that already exists in the insider 
trading context between holders of material non-public information and 
the shareholders owning the effected securities.222 Accomplishing this 
would require a statutory or regulatory addition that expressly called for 
a fiduciary duty to attach once a structurer or seller of a security decides 
to engage in activity that creates a material conflict of interest between it 
and the long investors. This, however, would be a cumbersome and ill-
suited approach, especially in light of the more streamlined 
recommendation made infra. 
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Fiduciary duties that come from the insider trading context are 
judicial constructs to cope with the fraud element of Rule 10b-5.223 As 
such, they are less suited for use in the context of material conflicts of 
interest. First, fiduciary duties require much work by the courts to figure 
out when such duties actually attach.224 Second, breach of fiduciary 
duties only implicates Rule 10b-5 and not the other disclosure 
provisions of the securities laws.225 Third, a mere breach of fiduciary 
duty is probably not enough to attach liability under Rule 10b-5 because 
deception, omission or misrepresentation must also occur.226 As such 
they leave investors with less causes of action than the alternative of 
adding a disclosure requirement or exemption to the existing statutes. 
Furthermore, it seems incongruous to provide investors and the SEC 
with causes of action as remedies that relate only to fraud when a large 
part of the issue is simple lack of disclosure by the party having the 
conflict of interest.227 Third, a fiduciary duty addition to existing statutes 
or regulations would likely not reflect the fact that Section 621 only 
makes its prohibition for one year after the sale of the security in 
question.228 Therefore, beyond that timeframe, this addition would 
actually be more restrictive than Section 621, which limits itself to only 
one year.229 
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4. Adding a Disclosure Exemption to The SEC’s Rule  
Implementing Section 621 is the Most Effective Resolution 
 
The best possible solution would be to add a disclosure exemption 
to Section 621’s general prohibition that effectively requires structurers 
and sellers of asset-backed securities to disclose their short positions on 
such products and give investors access to all relevant underlying 
information they have regarding the products. In effect, this is a 
disclosure requirement because Section 621’s prohibition on material 
conflicts of interest is left in place unless the disclosure exemption is 
met. Disclosure in this form would be the most favorable solution 
because it informs investors without unnecessarily restricting their 
purchasing ability. It is consistent with the goals of the securities laws.230 
It keeps structurers or sellers and buyers on equal footing while allowing 
the market to price the affected securities accordingly.231 It recognizes 
and respects that informed parties often have reasonable yet different 
outlooks on certain investments regardless of who structured the 
investments as well as divergent needs in terms of the risks they decide 
to take.232 The implementation of a disclosure exemption could be 
achieved in two different ways. First, Section 621 could be amended to 
include a disclosure exemption. Second, SEC Rule 127B233, the SEC’s 
rule regulating Section 621, could be implemented with a disclosure 
exemption.234 
Amending Section 621 to include a disclosure exemption is 
unfavorable because it requires more action on Congress’s part.235 To 
amend Section 621, now that it has been passed into law, would require 
Congress to pass an additional law.236 This seems like a step backwards 
and markedly more difficult than adding such an exemption to the SEC 
Rule implementing Section 621, as described below. First, the SEC 
would probably have to put its rule making on hold while Congress 
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revisited Section 621.237 Second, Congress would have to have to agree 
on proper language and garner enough votes to pass the amendment.238 
Adding a disclosure exemption to SEC Rule 127B is within the 
SEC’s authority and presents the most streamlined and effective process 
for a solution. Under Section 28 of the Securities Act, the SEC has the 
authority to create this exemption.239 Indeed, in proposing Rule 127B, 
the SEC mentioned this authority in its discussion of a possible 
disclosure exemption.240 SEC Commissioner Troy A. Paredes noted his 
concern about the proposed rule’s lack of a role for disclosure, noting 
that a role for disclosure would be consistent with the overall philosophy 
of the securities laws and preventing the limitation of investor’s 
choices.241 Having the agency that is in the process of studying 
disclosure in this context, has ample experience drafting securities-
related rules and regulations, and will enforce the rule upon 
implementation provides an advantage in terms of streamlining the 
process of adding the disclosure exemption and making sure it is drafted 
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appropriately.242 Finally, because disclosure is only as effective as its 
timeliness, as recognized by the SEC,243 such an exemption should 
contain guidance on the timeliness of disclosure and a clawback 
provision for cases when the conflict occurs after the sale of the security 
to the buyer.244 
C. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION IN SEC RULE 127B 
The current draft of SEC Rule 127B is printed below.245 In bold is 
this Comment’s proposed disclosure exemption and a clawback 
provision accompanying it. The disclosure exemption requires 
disclosure of both the material conflict of interest and raw data 
underlying the security in question. It covers situations where the 
covered party has an actual material conflict of interest and where such a 
party intends to enter into any transaction where it would develop a 
material conflict of interest. The clawback provision allows purchasers a 
right to rescission of the affected security upon the development of a 
material conflict on the part of any of the covered parties. 
§ 230.127B CONFLICTS OF INTEREST RELATING TO CERTAIN 
SECURITIZATIONS 
(a) Unlawful activity. An underwriter, placement agent, initial 
purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of 
an asset-backed security (as such term is defined in section 3 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S.C. [§] 78c), which for the 
purposes of this rule shall include a synthetic asset-backed security), 
shall not, at any time for a period ending on the date that is one year 
after the date of the first closing of the sale of the asset- backed security, 
engage in any transaction that would involve or result in any material 
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conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a transaction arising 
out of such activity. 
(b) Excepted activity. The following activities shall not be 
prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section: 
(1) Risk-mitigating hedging activities. Risk-mitigating hedging 
activities in connection with positions or holdings arising out of the 
underwriting, placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of an asset-
backed security, provided that such activities are designed to reduce the 
specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or 
sponsor associated with such positions or holdings; or 
(2) Liquidity commitment. Purchases or sales of asset-backed 
securities made pursuant to and consistent with commitments of the 
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any 
affiliate or subsidiary of such entity, to provide liquidity for the asset-
backed security; or 
(3) Bona fide market-making. Purchases or sales of asset-backed 
securities made pursuant to and consistent with bona fide market-
making in the asset-backed security. 
(4) Disclosure of Material Conflicts of Interest and Underlying 
Information. Purchases or sales of asset-backed securities where the 
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any 
affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity discloses (1) its material 
conflict of interest or intent to enter into a transaction that would create 
a material conflict of interest; and (2) all raw information that it 
possesses about the underlying assets. 
(i) Clawback provision. Where the underwriter, placement agent, 
initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such 
entity enters into any transaction that would create a material conflict of 
interest, that entity must disclose that material conflict of interest and all 
raw information that it possesses about the underlying assets or offer the 
buyer rescission of the affected security. Additionally, even if disclosure 
is made in accordance with this provision, all buying parties in this 
circumstance are entitled to rescission of the security upon their 
election. 
 
